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Introduction
The world is a mess. Populism, xenophobia and Islamophobia; misogyny and racism; 
the closing of borders against the neediest – the existential crisis of modernity calls for 
a firm response from ethics. Why, instead of engaging with these problems through 
traditional ethics, worry about private international law, that most technical of tech-
nical fields of law? My claim in this chapter: not despite, because of its technical 
character. Private international law provides such an ethic, an ethic of responsivity. 
It provides us with a technique of ethics, a technique that helps us conceptualise and 
address some of the most pressing issues of our time. It is not only ethically relevant, 
it is itself an ethic. Let me explain.1
Private International Law and Ethics
Whether private international law has an ethical dimension is a question that has 
long been discussed.2 On one level, the relevance should be obvious. First, private 
international law decisions often have to grapple with the ethical challenges listed 
above; indeed, it is often in private international law cases that these issues come up 
concretely. Xenophobia and populism regularly occur as refusals to apply foreign 
 1 This is the expanded written version of my keynote address at the Edinburgh Conference entitled 
‘Private International Law: Embracing Diversity’. I thank Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm and María 
Blanca Noodt Taquela for the invitation and participants for a lively and very helpful discussion.
 2 The most comprehensive such project, one that has influenced the argument in this chapter, is Muir 
Watt, H. (2017) ‘Hospitality, Tolerance, and Exclusion in Legal Form: Private International Law and 
the Politics of Difference’, Current Legal Problems, vol. 70, no. 1, 111–47; Muir Watt, H. (2018) 
‘Discours sur les méthodes du droit international privé (des formes juridiques de l’inter-altérité)’, 
Recueil des cours, vol. 389. See also, for example, some of the contributions in Childress, D. E. III 
(ed.) (2012) The Role of Ethics in International Law, Cambridge University Press. 
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law (even though the reverse is not true: such refusals are not necessarily evidence 
of xenophobia).3 Islamophobia in particular frequently appears as ‘Shariaphobia’, 
fear of Islamic law, and thus in the context of private international law. The backlash 
against the Archbishop of Canterbury’s proposal to give Islamic law a place in Britain 
is one example; another is the foreign law amendments and laws in the United States, 
which ostentatiously ban courts from applying any foreign law but are really mostly 
directed against the application of Islamic law.4 Misogyny and racism are both issues 
for private international law, especially where feminism and multiculturalism come 
to a clash in view of a foreign law that discriminates against women.5
Second, even where such ethical challenges are discussed without reference to 
private international law, private international law often remains relevant. Take, as 
an important example, the current refugee crisis. Numerous questions related to it – 
whether a refugee’s child marriage should be recognised, what the refugee’s domicile 
is and so forth – concern, at heart, issues of private international law. Moreover, even 
the refugee’s status itself is, to a considerable extent, a question of private interna-
tional law, in accordance with what Karen Knop has called private citizenship.6 It 
goes largely unrecognised (though it ought not to) that Hannah Arendt, when she 
discusses the famous ‘right to have rights’ as a defence of refugee rights, uses a pri-
vate international law example to make her point: ‘a German citizen under the Nazi 
regime might not be able to enter a mixed marriage abroad because of the Nuremberg 
laws’.7 Private international law is present even where it is not recognised.
Three Positions against Ethics
If, therefore, private international law is somehow related to questions of ethics, a 
direct importance is nonetheless often denied. Three positions can be separated, each 
related to one term in the discipline’s name: private, international, law. Because it is 
international, it is considered incapable of dealing with ethical questions. Because 
 3 See also Clermont, K. M. and T. Eisenberg (2007) ‘Xenophilia or Xenophobia in American Courts? 
Before and After 9/ 11’, 4 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 441–64.
 4 On the former, see Griffith-Jones, R. (ed.) (2013) Islam and English Law, Cambridge University 
Press. On the latter, see Fellmeth, A. (2012) ‘U.S. State Legislation to Limit Use of International and 
Foreign Law’, 106 Am. J. Int’l L. 107; Volokh, E. (2014) ‘Religious Laws (Especially Islamic Law) 
in American Courts’, 66 Okla. L. Rev., and, for a broader reading of foreign law bans as directed not 
just against Islamic law but against foreign law in general, Rahdert, M. C. (2016) ‘Exceptionalism 
Unbound: Appraising American Resistance to Foreign Law’, 65 Cath. U. L. Rev. 537.
 5 See Knop, K., R. Michaels and A. Riles (2012) ‘From Multiculturalism to Technique: Feminism, 
Multiculturalism, and the Conflict of Laws Style’, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 589; for a feminist approach, see 
also Banu, R. (2017) ‘A Relational Feminist Approach to Conflict of Laws’, 24 Michigan Journal of 
Gender and Law 1.
 6 Knop, K. (2008) ‘Citizenship, Public and Private’, 71 L. & Contemp. Probs. 309. In French law, the 
law of aliens is part of private international law.
 7 Arendt, H. (1994) The Origins of Totalitarianism, Schocken Books, 294. For the historical background, 
see, for example, Caestecker, F. and D. Fraser (2008) ‘The Extraterritorial Application of the Nuremberg 
Laws. Rassenschande and Mixed Marriages in European Liberal Democracies’, 10 J. Hist. Int’l L. 35. 
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it is private, it is considered irrelevant to questions of ethics. And because it is law, 
more precisely technical law, it is considered inadequate. Each of these critiques 
shall be briefly discussed in turn.
The first position is that private international law, as an international technical dis-
cipline, is incapable of dealing with matters of private international law. Understood 
as a discipline that merely allocates substantive and ethical decisions to the proper 
sovereign – whether based on comity, the seat of a legal relation, or the closest 
connection – private international law wears a ‘blindfold’ with regard to the ethical 
content of these laws themselves. Private international law in this sense is ethically 
‘neutral’.
Among those who hold this view, differences exist as to what a proper response 
would be. While some support such neutrality, others believe that ethical concerns 
must be taken seriously within private international law. A narrower response is to 
use the public policy exception as an ‘ethical moment’,8 the application of substantive 
and ethical ideas to avoid application of a law that had been designated as applicable 
before without consideration to its substance. A broader response is to replace the 
technical conflict of laws altogether with a method that focuses on the ‘real conflicts’ 
which are, in principle, substantive conflicts.9
A second position is that private international law is irrelevant because it deals 
with small questions without ethical relevance. For this perspective, ethical questions 
are, by contrast, big questions and are, as such, the business of public, not private, 
international law. Robert Wai could be understood to hold such a view when he says 
that
[w]ar and depression, the twin nightmares of public international lawyers and 
international trade lawyers . . . are not the overriding concerns of private interna-
tional law. Private law conflicts are instead disputes among private parties about 
a defective product, an accident, or a violated contract. Focusing away from the 
extremes of international anarchy permits a calmer view of the role of contestation 
and dissensus.10
Even granting that war and depression are the more important ethical issues, 
private international law is related to these issues as well: it has long (though 
intermittently) been discussed as a response to the enmity that spurs war,11 and it 
 8 Knop et al. (2012), above fn. 5, at 640–2.
 9 Singer, J. W. (1989) ‘Real Conflicts’, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 74ff. 
10 Wai, R. (2005) ‘Transnational Private Law and Private Ordering in a Contested Global Society’, 46 
Harv. Int’l L.J. 471, 472–3.
11 Schulze, G. (2016) ‘Die Überwindung von Feindschaft durch Kollisionsrecht – Ein Grundgedanke 
des Internationalen Privatrechts von der Antike bis zu seiner Vergemeinschaftung’, in Strangas et al. 
(eds), Kollision, Feindschaft und Recht, Nomos, 1097–128; see also Spain, A. (2013) ‘International 
Dispute Resolution in an Era of Globalization’, in Byrnes, A., M. Hayashi and C. Michaelsen (eds), 
International Law in the New Age of Globalization, Martinus Nijhoff, 41, 68–9. The Hague Academy 
of International Law was explicitly set up as an instrument for the promotion of peace through law; 
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deals with those trade relations that make up the financial markets and thus can 
contribute to depression.12 But it seems questionable already whether the core issues 
of private international law are really less relevant from an ethical perspective, 
merely because they (often) deal with fewer individuals. Ethics is relevant in the 
particular, the concrete.
A third position is that private international law, at least in its traditional form, is 
inadequate to deal with questions of private international law because it is technical. 
In this realm, Joel Paul deplores the isolation of private international law from public 
international law (and therefore from politics),13 and Horatia Muir Watt criticises 
private international law for its ‘epistemological tunnel-vision, actively providing 
immunity and impunity to abusers of private sovereignty’.14 These authors, and like-
minded others, do not think of private international law as intrinsically incapable of 
dealing with ethical questions, but they do think that it is in its current form. They ask 
us, in other ways, to rethink private international law fundamentally, in order to move 
it from a technical to a political understanding.
The Other in Private International Law
Against all these critiques, how do we get at the ethical dimension of private inter-
national law? Think of what ethics is about at its core: it is about our relation to the 
Other.15 Ethics may be, abstractly, the discipline of right and wrong, but most of 
that is focused on how we should ‘do unto others’, on our relation with an Other. 
This Other is a fascinating concept. ‘Je est un autre,’ says Rimbaud famously – ‘I is 
an Other’ – and though here the focus is more on the I than on the Other, the quote 
expresses very well the complex dual nature of the Other in relation to the self. 
The Other is like me in that she is another sentient being. And the Other is unlike 
me because she is different, an Other. She is both, me and not me. My relation to 
the Other involves me as an actor, but it also involves me in the Other: how I relate 
to the Other says something about me, it says something about how I relate to me.
This should suggest how private international law is related to ethics. Let us leave 
aside, for a moment, both its specific doctrines and tools – its technical character 
– and its ultimate goals – its results that are usually discussed when questions of 
it fulfils this in part through courses in both public and private international law. Nonetheless, public 
international lawyers tend to ignore the role of private international law; for example, it is absent from 
Bailliet, C. M. and K. Mujezinovic Larsen (eds) (2015) Promoting Peace Through International Law, 
Oxford University Press.
12 See Riles, A. (2014) ‘Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws Approach’, 47 Cornell 
Int’l L.J. 63.
13 Paul, J. R. (1988) ‘The Isolation of Private International Law’, 7 Wis. J. Int’l L. 149, 164ff; see also 
Paul, J. R. (2008) ‘The Transformation of International Comity’, 71 L. & Contemp. Probs. 19.
14 Muir Watt, H. (2011) ‘Private International Law Beyond the Schism’ 2 Transnational Legal Theory 
347, 374.
15 On this theme, see, for example, Waldenfels, B. (2007) The Question of the Other, State University 
of New York Press.
 a n e t h i c  o f  r e s p o n s i v i t y  | 15
ethics and politics are at stake. Let us instead focus on the core situation that private 
international law addresses. In private international law, we deal with something 
foreign: a foreign party, a foreign contact, a foreign law. We do not face the ‘normal’ 
case in which law, parties, facts all belong to the same order; we have to relate our 
normative order to this foreign element. We deal, then, with an Other.16 That Other 
can be a foreign law, it can be a foreign party, or it can be another foreign element. 
But insofar as a foreign element is necessary to trigger a meaningful conflict of laws 
analysis, the foreign, the Other, is a constant of private international law regardless of 
what else one thinks the discipline is about.
Is however, the foreign element that triggers a conflict of laws analysis an 
Other in the sense of ethics? Conflict of laws deals with foreign laws; ethics deals 
with persons. Are those the same thing? It is not necessary to think we have ethical 
obligations towards foreign law, as Pierre Legrand has frequently argued:17 our 
ethical obligations are towards people, not laws. But laws matter only insofar as 
they apply to people, and people in return come with laws. This means that treating 
people and treating laws are interrelated: our treatment of foreign law is our treat-
ment of people. The Afghani couple who come to our court carry with them the 
laws under which they got married. A refusal to apply that law (or recognise their 
marriage under that law) concerns not only, not even primarily the law, but instead 
the persons who rely on it. Our attitude towards the law under which a contract 
was formed is closely related to the contract itself and thereby to the persons who 
entered into that contract and who constituted their interrelation, and thus their 
identity, through it.
Three Attitudes
Foreign law is, then, like the Other: similar and different at the same time. Foreign 
law is similar because it is law, just like the law of the forum is law. Foreign law is 
different because it is foreign law, not the law of the forum. If this is correct, then 
one minimum ethical demand within private international law is to acknowledge this 
situation of the Other as both different and similar to us. Such acknowledgment is 
denied both where difference is denied and where similarity is denied.
Denial of difference is the easier variant. It occurs where the law of the forum is 
applied as a matter of course (lex fori approach), regardless of the foreign element 
involved in a fact pattern, because it is assumed that the foreign element is in all 
relevant regards similar to the local elements that domestic law has in mind. In this 
case the law ignores that the claimant before the court is a foreigner; it ignores that the 
tort before the court occurred elsewhere; it ignores that the intentions of the parties to 
the contract were built against background expectations different from those existing 
in the forum’s state. If there were no private international law, then difference would 
16 Berman, P. S. (2010) ‘Conflict of Laws and the Negotiation of Difference’, in Sarat, A. D., 
M. Umphrey and L. Douglas (eds), Law and the Stranger, Stanford University Press, 141, 143ff.
17 For example, Legrand, P. (2012) ‘Foreign Law in the Third Space’, juridikum 32.
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always be denied, and that would be unethical. It is through private international law 
that it is acknowledged.
Similarity, by contrast, is denied where foreign law is rejected tout court, without 
specific consideration of how it plays out in the concrete context. The foreign law 
amendments in the US and the English aversion to Islamic law, mentioned before, 
are one example of such fundamental rejection. They are based on the idea of fun-
damental otherness. We find this idea of fundamental otherness especially vis-à-vis 
religious laws.18 But the idea goes beyond this where American exceptionalism is 
invoked to justify a fundamental otherness of any foreign law as a reason for its 
irrelevance. That would be unethical in its refusal to acknowledge similarity.
Both the denial of difference and the denial of similarity thus lead to the same 
result: application of forum law, rejection of foreign law. In part, they rest on a 
similar attitude, namely a facile unwillingness to understand the Other, to deal with 
it. That unwillingness plays out in different methods, however: the lex fori approach 
occurs without consideration of otherness, the principled rejection of foreign law 
follows from an exaggeration of otherness. And although they reach the same result 
in the area of choice of law (because in each case forum law applies), they play out 
differently for the recognition of foreign judgments. Where difference is denied, 
foreign judgments will be recognised without any limits; where similarity is denied, 
foreign judgments will never be recognised.
It is necessary, therefore, to accept the Other as Other in private international 
law, and that means as similar and different alike. This creates a first, and important, 
ethical position. Paul Schiff Berman has helped explain this position, which he 
calls cosmopolitan,19 although it is arguably not new but actually intrinsic to private 
international law itself. Such a position creates the discipline’s proper attitude, which 
is one in which the possibility of deference to foreign law should be considered. But 
the attitude itself does not tell us when and how such deference should take place. 
Something more must be involved. What should it be?
Three Ethics of Private International Law20
An Ethic of Tolerance?
A first ethic in private international law would be an ethic of tolerance. Tolerance 
certainly would offer a huge improvement over the ‘zero tolerance’ approach the US 
18 Michaels, R. (2016) ‘Religiöse Rechte und postsäkulare Rechtsvergleichung’, in Zimmermann, R. 
(ed.), Zukunftsfragen der Rechtsvergleichung, Mohr Siebeck, 40, 53ff.
19 Berman, P. S. (2005) ‘Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining Governmental 
Interests in a Global Era’, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1819.
20 H. Muir Watt has, in two recent publications (above fn. 2), helpfully linked certain ethical positions 
to certain private international law doctrines. My typology is inspired by hers, although there are 
differences in the types I distinguish and the implications I draw for the relation between private 
international law and ethics.
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administration has taken on its border towards refugees,21 the archetypical Others 
to whom ethical conduct is owed. In sharp contrast, private international law can 
be understood as the discipline that encapsulates toleration of the Other. Werner 
Goldschmidt based his whole private international law on the idea of tolerance;22 
other authors express similar ideas.23 Benjamin Cardozo, writing for the New York 
Court of Appeals in 1918, expressed the attitude in a way that has become widely 
cited: ‘We are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a problem is wrong 
because we deal with it otherwise at home.’24
Tolerance is, at first, only an attitude, but it appears also in form of a doctrine. 
That doctrine is comity, which the US Supreme Court once defined, tellingly, as 
follows:
‘Comity,’ in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one 
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition 
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial 
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, 
and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection 
of its laws.25
Foreign law, thus, is tolerated, though not as a matter of legal obligation but instead as 
a matter of ‘international duty and convenience’. As a consequence, the extent of this 
tolerance is unclear. And unclear also are the precise limits on this tolerance, which 
are expressed through the public policy (or ordre public) exception, which serves as 
a ‘limit of tolerance’.26
The vagueness of both doctrines, comity and public policy, is not an accident; 
it is a sign of a deeper problem with understanding private international law as
21 Office of the Attorney General, Memorandum for Federal Prosecutors Along the Southwest Border—
Zero-Tolerance for Offenses Under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a), https:// www.justice.gov/ opa/ press-release/ 
file/ 1049751 
22 Goldschmidt, W. (1977) Derecho Internacional Privado. Derecho de la Tolerancia, 3rd edn, 
Depalma, Prologue; see Oyarzábal, M. J. A. (2017) ‘Goldschmidt, Werner’, in Elgar Encyclopedia of 
Private International Law, Edward Elgar, vol. 1, 852, 857–8.
23 See, for example, Katzenbach, N. de B. (1956) ‘Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and 
Tolerances in Interstate and International Law’, 65 Yale L.J. 1087.
24 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 111.
25 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 143 (1895). For the history of comity in US conflict of laws, see, most 
comprehensively, Dodge, W. S. (2015) ‘International Comity in American Law’, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 
2071. For a plea to re-establish the private international law underpinnings of comity, see Childress 
III, D. E. (2010) ‘Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws’, 44 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 11.
26 Struycken, A. V. M. (2004) ‘Co-ordination and Co-operation in Respectful Disagreement’, Recueil 
des cours, vol. 311, 9, 395. For a central role of the public policy doctrine, see also Boden, D. (2005) 
‘Le pluralisme juridique en droit international privé’, 49 Arch. phil. droit 275–316.
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tolerance. Tolerance, although discussed already in antiquity, is an achievement 
of the Enlightenment. When Locke, Bayle and Voltaire, among others, write about 
it, what they have in mind is the treatment of religious difference.27 It thus corre-
lates, historically, with competing truth claims. Toleration is a way to live with 
the Other while being able to maintain the idea that the Other is wrong. It is in 
this sense that tolerance is another word for indifference, as Somerset Maugham 
allegedly said.28 Indifference, in turn, is described by Karl Jaspers as ‘the mildest 
form of intolerance: secret contempt – let others believe what they like, it doesn’t 
concern me’.29
This idea of toleration as secret disdain can be found in private international 
law understood as comity and public policy: foreign law is applied not because of 
but despite its own value, through the forum’s enlightened tolerance for what it, in 
principle, disagrees with. Such tolerance is therefore limited when that disagreement 
becomes too great. True understanding of the Other is not required and often does not 
take place. Where a US Court dismisses antitrust claims from Ecuadorian victims of 
a global cartel and defers to the regulatory interests of the Ecuadorian government, 
such application of comity smacks of Jasper’s kind of secret disdain if the court 
never truly assesses what those regulatory interests are.30 And, indeed, as critics of 
comity have often pointed out: if the foreign law is considered wrong, how can its 
application ever be justified? It can only be tolerated as long as it is harmless, and like 
the refugees at the US-Mexican border, that tolerance is withdrawn once the Other is 
viewed as dangerous.31
27 See, generally, Forst, R. (2017) ‘Toleration’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: 
https:// plato.stanford.edu/ entries/ toleration
28 The quote seems apocryphal. It does appear, however, in the Monthly Summary of the Religious 
Press, The Japan Weekly Mail, 14 Jan 1905, 44, at 45, where it is attributed to an article by a writer 
calling himself Entei in the publication Koye (Roman Catholic).
29 Jaspers, K. [1953] (2014) Origin and Goal of History (transl. M. Bullock), Routledge, 221. Jaspers 
himself distinguishes indifference from tolerance, which he defines as ‘open-minded: it knows its 
own limitations and seeks to integrate them humanly into diversity, without reducing the notions and 
ideas of faith to a common denominator’. Ibid., 221. 
30 F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004). For my critique of the Court, 
see Michaels, R. (2011) ‘Empagran’s Empire: International Law and Statutory Interpretation in the 
U.S. Supreme Court of the Twenty-First Century’, in Sloss, D. L. et al. (eds), International Law in 
the U.S. Supreme Court: Continuity and Change, Cambridge University Press, 533. For discussion of 
developing nations’ interests and how to accommodate them, see Michaels, R. (2016) ‘Supplanting 
Foreign Antitrust’, 79 L. & Contemp. Probs. 223.
31 Cf. Treitschke, H. von (1916) Politics (transl. B. Dugdale and T. de Bille), Macmillan, vol. II, 
605: ‘Let us make as many treaties as we like about international civil law [German original: 
Internationales Privatrecht, private international law], but they must all presuppose that the alien is 
not troublesome to ourselves. Should he become so, the State must have power to expel him without 
giving reasons, even if it has signed a treaty which, as a rule, ensures security of residence to the 
subjects of another Government.’
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An Ethic of Recognition?
Goethe thought so, too: ‘Tolerance should really be only a temporary attitude; it 
must lead to recognition. To tolerate means to offend.’32 Is recognition therefore a 
better approach for private international law? Recognition of the Other looks, at first, 
like a unidirectional relation between a recognising subject and a recognised object. 
However, since Hegel, recognition is often viewed as a mutual, reciprocal process: 
it is through recognition of the Other as an intentional person that we manage to 
recognise ourselves. If tolerance was the ethical position of the eighteenth century, 
recognition was the position of the nineteenth century: now, minorities – religious or 
otherwise – demanded more than mere toleration; they demanded to be recognised 
in their identity. But recognition has also become a core concern in the late twentieth 
century, encouraged especially through the neo-Hegelian theories of, respectively, 
Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth.33 Charles Taylor argues that the need for recogni-
tion is universal; the risk of its absence arises with modernity. Recognition accounts 
for the fact, described earlier, that the Other is both similar and different: recognition 
accounts equal dignity to the Other, but it also enables a politics of difference, in 
which the unique identity of the Other is recognised. Axel Honneth expands such 
ideas to focus more on the specific relations between the self and the Other and 
distinguishes three: love (for self-confidence), rights (for self-respect) and solidarity 
(for self-esteem).
Clearly, such ideas find responses in the law. Private international law in par-
ticular is amenable to ideas of recognition, given the central role that recognition 
plays for the discipline. Foreign judgments are recognised, as were, for a long time, 
so-called ‘vested rights’34 established under foreign law. Within the European Union, 
there is even discussion of resting an entire system of private international law on 
ideas of mutual recognition.35 And indeed, as in ethics, so in private international law 
the idea of recognition has gained much support.36
And yet, recognition is insufficient as well, both in ethics and in private inter-
national law. Nancy Fraser voices an important concern that is mirrored in private 
international law: the focus on recognition is insufficient for justice unless it is 
32 ‘Toleranz sollte eigentlich nur eine vorübergehende Gesinnung sein; sie muss zur Anerkennung 
führen. Dulden heißt Beleidigen.’ Goethe, J. W., ‘Maximen und Reflexionen’, Werke XII, Beck 
(1981), 385, no. 151.
33 Taylor, C. (1992) ‘The Politics of Recognition’, in Taylor, C., Multiculturalism and the Politics of 
Recognition, Princeton University Press, 23–73; Honneth, A. (1992) The Struggle for Recognition: 
The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, Polity Press.
34 Dicey, A. V. (1896) A Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws. Stevens 
and Sons Limited, 24–25, and 28 et seq.
35 Lagarde, P. (ed.) (2013) La reconnaissance des situations en droit international privé, A. Pedone.
36 Isailovic, I. (2016) ‘La reconnaissance politique en droit transnational: Les identités, les marginal-
isations et le droit international privé’, in Tourmé Jouannet, E., H. Muir Watt, O. Frouville and J. 
Matringe (eds), Droit international et reconnaissance, A. Pedone, 301.
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coupled with a focus on issues of distribution.37 We find a similar concern in private 
international law, in particular in the debate over the application of foreign law: how 
can we reconcile the recognition and applicability of an unjust law with our commit-
ment to substantive justice? Jacques Rancière goes further in his critique when he 
questions what it is that is being recognised: the identity of the Other, he suggests, 
does not predate the act of recognition.38 And, indeed, foreign legal systems do not 
fully exist prior to their recognition,39 and foreign law is always applied in a way 
different from how it exists in the foreign system.40
Two examples demonstrate these shortcomings. When the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, in its Grunkin Paul decision, required German authorities to 
recognise a newborn’s name under Danish law, it did so on the basis of a duty to 
recognise the child’s status.41 The child is thus recognised, essentially, as having a 
Danish identity, as demonstrated in his or her name. This may be a defensible result. 
But does such recognition not ignore the multifaceted identity of the individual who 
is, as is always the case in private international law, caught between different orders? 
Rather than recognising a pre-existing identity, it is the decision itself that constructs 
this identity. A second example arises from the French refusal to recognise unilateral 
divorces under Moroccan law as violating a woman’s equal rights.42 The woman is 
here recognised as equal to the man, but in refusing to recognise her divorce, courts 
recreate her as a split personality: considered divorced in her country of origin (and 
in her faith community) yet considered married in the court’s country.
Indeed, one problem of recognition can be that it goes too far: by creating iden-
tities, recognition cuts through the fluidity of the private international law individual 
who exists between legal systems. As a consequence, and perhaps perversely, recog-
nition can enhance separation and thereby lead to discrimination. Elizabeth Povinelli 
describes such a process in the context of the recognition of aborigines in Australia: 
although ostensibly a benevolent act, the recognition actually hardens the distance 
between aborigines and the Australian state and confines them within their identity.43
37 Fraser, N. (2001) ‘Recognition without Ethics? ’, 18 Theory, Culture & Society 21–42; for the discus-
sion with Honneth, see Fraser, N. and A. Honneth (2003) Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-
Philosophical Exchange, Verso.
38 See Deranty, J. P. (2003) ‘Jacques Rancière’s contribution to the ethics of recognition’, 31 Political 
Theory 136; Honneth, A. and J. Rancière (2016), Recognition or Disagreement, Columbia University 
Press. 
39 Michaels, R. (2017) ‘Law and Recognition—Towards a Relational Concept of Law’, in Roughan, N. 
and A. Halpin (eds), In Pursuit of Pluralist Jurisprudence, Cambridge University Press, 90–115.
40 See Jansen, N. and R. Michaels (2003) ‘Die Auslegung iund Fortbildung ausländischen Rechts’, 116 
Zeitschrift für Zivilprozess, 3–56.
41 CJEU, 14 October 2008, C-353-06, Grunkin and Paul.
42 Fournier, P. (2016) Muslim Marriage in Western Courts: Lost in Transplantation, Routledge, 54–5 
with references.
43 Povinelli, E. A. (2002) The Cunning of Recognition: Indigenous Alterities and the Making of 
Australian Multiculturalism, Duke University Press. 
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An Ethic of Hospitality?
If tolerance is insufficient, and recognition is intrusive, the solution may lie in an 
ethic of hospitality. This ethic can be grounded in Martin Buber’s philosophy, as 
developed further by Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida. Buber suggests that 
the world always exists in relation to the self, but it does so in two very different 
relations that he calls I-It and I-Thou.44 Simplified, I-It relations treat the other as 
an object, whereas I-Thou relations treat the other as a subject, as an Other. This 
is related to the Kantian idea of treating others as ends in themselves. But it goes 
beyond that because Buber’s focus is less on the Other and more on the relation 
itself. The Other is simultaneously recognised as an Other and intrinsically put in 
relation to the self.
This is the thought that Levinas develops further and turns into a meta-ethical 
position that transcends the is/ought separation: the relation itself creates a normative 
claim on the self.45 For Levinas, insofar like Buber, the Other is always already in a 
relation to me (I-Thou). But the relation is not formal and abstract: the Other comes as 
a concrete person with specifics (a ‘face’) and with concrete needs: the Other is poor, 
or dirty, or sick, or helpless. This Other therefore commands me through his very 
existence and his very needs; he demands from me: let me live. That ethical demand 
has priority over the ontology of the Other, meaning the Other comes to me already in 
an ethical relation, with a command. And I can respond to this command by following 
it, or not, but I cannot ignore the command.
This has surprising parallels with private international law. The foreign law 
already stands in a relation with the forum’s law; it is never ‘merely there’.46 That law 
is specific – it is not ‘foreign law’ in the abstract, or the law of a fictitious entity like 
Ruritania. It has needs: it has no force in our courts, without the help of the judge who 
is willing to enforce it. Its command to the forum is: help me in this. Do not kill me. 
Do not be jurispathic, to use Robert Cover’s term.47 And so the forum can yield to this 
command or not, but it cannot escape it.
Take, for example, partners in a same-sex marriage celebrated elsewhere, asking 
for recognition of their marriage. The marriage under foreign law is part of their 
identity, the plea for recognition is clear (and, where the status of being married can 
prevent deportation, it is literally a plea to save their lives).48 Now the court cannot 
44 Buber, M. (1970) I and Thou, T. & T. Clark. 
45 Levinas’ position is developed at several places, especially in his Levinas, E. (1961) Totality and 
Infinity, Kluwer. For helpful introductions, see Levinas, E. (1995) Ethics and Infinity—Conversations 
with Philippe Nemo, Duquesne University Press; Morgan, M. L. (2011) The Cambridge Introduction 
to Emmanuel Levinas, Cambridge University Press, Ch. 3, 59ff.
46 Michaels, ‘Law and Recognition’, above fn. 39. 
47 Cover, R. M. (1983) ‘The Supreme Court, 1982 Term’ Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. 
Rev. 4, 40ff.
48 Jessurun d’Oliveira, H. U. (1999) ‘The Artifact of “Sham Marriages”’, Yearbook of Private 
International Law, vol. 1, 49–83.
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escape the demand: even if it denies the claim for recognition, it cannot thereby avoid 
the relation.49
Horatia Muir Watt, drawing on Derrida (who was in this respect influenced by 
Levinas) has demonstrated how such thoughts can inform an understanding of private 
international law.50 Traditional private international law, she suggests, recognises 
foreign law merely under certain conditions, namely a certain level of similarity; 
it is based only on ideas of tolerance. Hospitality as unconditional acceptance, by 
contrast, can be found in unilateral approaches to private international law. Here, the 
foreign law necessarily appears in its concrete specificity and gets applied because it 
wants (needs) to be applied according to the doctrine of unilateralism. Unilateralism 
is often rejected in private international law as an is/ought crossover: the fact that the 
foreign law wants to be applied (a fact) has no normative implication that the forum 
should apply it.51 A response can invoke Levinas: the mere fact that the foreign law 
appears related to us, in its specificity and with its needs (in this case: to be applied), 
creates an ethical plea for such application, but not yet more. The is/ought crossover 
is not the only criticism of unilateralism, however. The bigger problem is, arguably, 
that unilateralism is too powerful: by ceding to the other entirely, we give foreign law 
more force than domestic law. The US Supreme Court once discussed this possibility 
as absurd:
A rigid and literal enforcement of the full faith and credit clause, without regard to 
the statute of the forum, would lead to the absurd result that, wherever the conflict 
arises, the statute of each state must be enforced in the courts of the other, but cannot 
be in its own.52
Muir Watt suggests that this is not an insoluble problem: applicability of foreign law 
is not unlimited but instead remains under control of the public policy exception.53 
But this seems incompatible with the idea she draws on. Derrida in particular suggests 
that hospitality is not only unconditional but also unlimited; it requires to receive the 
stranger not just without any conditions (of similarity, even of giving her name), 
but also without any limitations: the host is required to offer literally everything: his 
house, his wealth, his family. Such absolute hospitality is an impossibility, while 
49 See Cossman, B. (2008) ‘Betwixt and Between Recognition: Migrating Same-Sex Marriages and the 
Turn Toward the Private’, 71 L. & Contemp. Probs. 153–68.
50 Muir Watt (2017), above fn. 2, draws on Derrida, J. (2000) Of Hospitality—Anne Dufourmantelle 
Invites Jacques Derrida to Respond, Stanford University Press; see also Derrida, J. (2001) 
Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, Routledge. Levinas’ influence on Derrida’s concept of hospital-
ity, palpable throughout both texts, becomes even clearer in Derrida, J. (1999) Adieu to Emmanuel 
Levinas, Stanford University Press.
51 Schurig, K. (1986) ‘Lois d’application immédiate und Sonderanknüpfungzwingenden Rechts: 
Erkenntnisfortschritt oder Mystifikation? ’, in Holl, W. and U. Klinge (eds), Internationales 
Privatrecht—Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht 55.
52 Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935).
53 Muir Watt (2017) ‘Politics of Difference’, above fn. 2, at 138.
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Muir Watt’s restriction is possible. At the same time, hospitality limited by a public 
policy exception is no longer hospitality in the sense of Derrida; at its core it is again 
merely limited deference.
An Ethic of Responsivity
The focus on relation
What, then, should an ethical approach to private international law look like? Some 
progress has been made. In the first section of this chapter, I demonstrated that the 
ethical relevance of private international law lies in its focus on the Other, and that 
it must recognise the Other as both similar and different, as both independent and 
related. That created an attitude of a principled willingness to defer to foreign law, 
but not more. In the second section, I discussed different ethical positions towards the 
Other – tolerance, recognition, hospitality – and related these to different approaches 
to private international law. These positions describe different degrees of willingness 
to defer to foreign law, as Muir Watt describes in her somewhat parallel project: 
apply foreign law never, sometimes, always.54 Different ethical positions do not, 
however, only differ in the degree of deference to the foreign. They also differ in 
the kind of relation they construct. Tolerance creates a relation of wilful ignorance; 
recognition creates a relation of hierarchy; hospitality rests on a relationship of need.
And the positions differ in the degree to which they view the Other as independ-
ent from that relation. Tolerance assumes the other to be independent, though it may 
require the Other to become more similar in order to justify being tolerated. Comity 
can be remarkably blind for the actual content of the foreign law. Recognition is more 
ambivalent: insofar as it is the act of recognition that constructs the Other, recognition 
becomes a violent act, one that defines the Other. Povinelli’s example, discussed 
before, comes to mind. Hospitality, finally, is the ethical position that positions the 
relation as irreducibly linked to the Other: the Other appears only in relation (Buber), 
and that relation is ethical before it is ontological (Levinas).
This suggests that it is worthwhile to shift the gaze from the Other to the relation 
in which the self stands to the Other, from the foreign law as such to the relation in 
which that foreign law stands to the forum. What is lacking here is a finer analysis 
of what exactly that relation entails. Both a plea for survival (Levinas) and unlimited 
hospitality (Derrida) are in themselves insufficient: mere survival is too minimal, 
unlimited hospitality is too maximal. Both can generate discussions about concrete 
ethical problems, but they do not entail them through logical deduction. Once we 
focus on the relation we no longer ask what is owed to the foreign law; instead we 
ask what the relation entails.
54 Ibid., at 115, 126.
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The Relevance of Technique
This is where technique becomes relevant. After all, in private international law we 
do not confine ourselves to a two-step analysis, in which we first define a deferential 
relation to the Other and then limit it through the public policy exception. Instead, 
the relation to the Other is established through a number of devices that are used in 
the analysis of private international law: characterisation, renvoi, adaptation, sub-
stitution, public policy and so on. These devices, which are ‘merely technical’, are 
often thought of as anathema to questions of ethics. At best, they are insufficient 
devices to avoid outcomes that are normatively undesirable – the US debate speaks 
in this context of ‘escape devices’.55 At worst, they are devices that blind the analyst 
for the actual ethical relevance in the case – this is what the European reception of 
the US conflicts revolution emphasised, and what new critical approaches to private 
international law re-establish.56
Technique is often thought to be merely that: opposed to theory and opposed to 
ethics. Muir Watt suggests, apodictically: ‘Often described as “theoretical”, these 
aspects of private international law are essentially technical and have little relation-
ship with the great questions of legal theory.’57 This may be true for the practical 
application of private international law, but it seems untrue for the field in general. 
Justice Frankfurter referred to Joseph Beale’s conflict of laws course as a course in 
jurisprudence, and Beale was arguably the most technical of conflicts scholars in the 
US.58 It is not only the case that private international law provides fruitful inspirations 
for legal theory;59 it is also the case that private international law can itself be viewed 
as a legal theory, and that its technical devices do not avoid difficult questions of 
politics and ethics but instead serve to formulate them in a way that is more prone to 
allowing responses.60
The theoretical and ethical content of the techniques of private international law 
cannot here be demonstrated with sufficient specificity. Two examples must suffice. 
55 Currie, B. (1959) ‘Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws’, Duke L.J. 171, 175. 
56 Muir Watt (2011), ‘Private International Law Beyond the Schism’, above fn. 14.
57 Ibid., at 380, fn. 163.
58 Frankfurter, F. (1943) ‘Henry Joseph Beale’, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 701, 703. Beale is almost universally 
rejected today; see only Symeonides, S. (2007) ‘The First Conflicts Restatement through the Eyes 
of Old: As Bad as its Reputation? ’, 32 Southern Ill. L.R. 39. See also Freund, P. A. (1946) ‘Chief 
Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws’, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1210: ‘Chief Justice Stone . . . would regard 
Conflict of Laws as a study serving in place of a course in Jurisprudence’, with citation to the passage 
by Frankfurter.
59 Maurer, A. and M. Renner (2010) ‘Kollisionsrechtliches Denken in der Rechtstheorie’, in Schramm, 
E. et al., Konflikte im Recht –Recht der Konflikte 125 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 
207–24.
60 Or so I have argued: Michaels, R. (2014) ‘Post-Critical Private International Law: From Politics 
to Technique’, in Fernández Arroyo, D. P. and H. Muir Watt (eds), Private International Law and 
Global Governance, Oxford University Press, 54–67.
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The first concerns the application of foreign law itself.61 True deference to foreign 
law puts the judge before an ethical dilemma: respect for the foreign law requires the 
judge on the one hand to get foreign law right and on the other hand to realise that 
he or she is not a part of the foreign law and can therefore not make authoritative 
claims to its meaning. The discipline of anthropology has, for the parallel problem 
that truly ‘going native’ is impossible, developed the device of ‘lateral thinking’: 
thinking through the Other, thinking ‘as if’ one were part of the Other.62 In private 
international law, the ‘foreign court theory’ according to which a judge is supposed 
to apply foreign law ‘as if’ he or she were sitting in the foreign court, takes a similar 
move. The foreign court theory must then be seen not as an impossibility but instead 
as a sophisticated and attractive ethical move.
Or take the aforementioned public policy exception. It is the response to another 
ethical dilemma: the conflict between the duty of deferring to foreign law and the duty 
to avoid the application of a law that is incompatible with fundamental values. The 
public policy exception actually responds in a very subtle way to minimise the con-
flict. First, it is directed not against the foreign law itself but only against the result of 
its application in the forum state. Second, the standard of review is not some supposed 
universal set of values, but instead the values of the forum state. Third, the public 
policy exception only sets in when there are sufficient connections to the forum state. 
All of this is like saying to the Other: I respect you, I do not question your identity and 
I do not suggest that my values are better than yours merely because they are mine. 
I merely minimise the impact of your identity insofar as it fundamentally upsets my 
home. And I do so because, in this concrete case, my home is so directly affected, 
because of the strong relationship between the conduct and my home. Seen like this, 
the public policy exception is not merely the ethical stop gap against the mechanical 
application of foreign law; it is itself a deeply ethical device.
Note what role ethics plays here. Ethics does not come before the devices of 
private international law, as a normative foundation to inform them. Nor does ethics 
come after them, as an ex post tool to evaluate their quality. Instead, ethics is within 
these devices themselves. These technical devices are themselves ethical construc-
tions: it is through private international law itself that an ethical position is formulated 
and at the same time put into practice. This is what it means to understand private 
international law as an ethic, not merely as grounded in one.
An Ethic of Responsivity
Finally, what kind of an ethic is it? The technique of private international law is 
not merely a device of fine-tuning comity to determine the exact border between 
deference and its limits. Instead, the technique of private international law is an ethic 
of a particular nature: it is, to borrow a concept from Bernhard Waldenfels, an ethic 
61 For the following, see Riles, A. (2008) ‘Cultural Conflicts’, 71 L. & Contemp. Probs. 273, 296ff. 
62 For a summary, see Gad, C. and C. B. Jensen (2016) ‘Lateral Concepts’, 2 Engaging Science, 
Technology, and Society 3–12.
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of responsivity.63 Responsivity is different from both intentionality and regularity: 
‘that with which I respond owes its meaning to the challenge to which it responds’.64 
Through the application of complicated technique vis-à-vis the foreign law, private 
international law takes the Other more seriously than mere deference would. The 
application of private international law rules is never purely mechanical; it always 
operates in response to the concrete Other law, and therefore private international law 
is always necessarily open.65 Thereby, private international law engages the Other. It 
takes the Other’s plea more seriously than mere deference would. It grapples with the 
Other. It puts the positions taken by the Other in perspective and in context. It creates 
a hypothetical dialogue with the Other – hypothetical because the dialogue takes 
place within private international law’s own position,66 but therefore no less real. The 
response can lead to a result that a conflict remains, just as in conflicts among individ-
uals the ethically required result is sometimes that the conflict remains. Responsivity 
does not merely equate deference. But responsivity makes rejection justifiable.
Private international law can act as an ethic of responsivity because it is not a 
merely theoretical position. It shares that emphasis on practice with existing positions 
in the discipline of ethics. It is, then, a practical ethic, but one of a specific kind 
because its practice consists of legal doctrine, in a particular kind of technical argu-
ment. Where the Other is a legal order, legal doctrine becomes the practice to which 
private international law responds: the Other is law, the relation to it is law and the 
ethic that emerges from that is law, too.
Conclusion
I have argued that private international law not only has ethical relevance, but that it 
is itself an ethic, namely an ethic of responsivity. That ethic relies on three founda-
tional building blocks, discussed in three sections: the Other, the relation to the Other 
and the technique of responsivity. The two first blocks exist in ethics more generally. 
The third is specific to private international law, simply because the technique of 
private international law is specific to private international law. The first two blocks 
do not need private international law. The third one is private international law’s own 
contribution to ethics.
63 See Waldenfels, B. (2003) ‘From Intentionality to Responsivity’, in Bernet, R. and D. J. Martino (eds), 
Phenomenology Today: The Schuwer Spep Lectures, 1998–2002, Simon Silverman Phenomenology 
Center, Duquesne University, 23–35; Waldenfels, The Question of the Other, above fn. 15, at 21ff.; 
Leistle, B. (2016) ‘Responsivity and (Some) Other Approaches to Alterity’, Anthropological Theory 
vol. 16, no. 1, 48–74. Waldenfels distinguishes responsivity as a creative process from technical 
responses as results from a programme: Waldenfels, B. (2015) Sozialität und AlteritätModi sozialer 
Erfahrung, Suhrkamp, 18–19. My use of technique encompasses the creativity, which is arguably 
always present in the process of private international law.
64 Waldenfels, ‘From Intentionality to Responsivity’, above fn. 63, at 24.
65 Schurig, K. (1981) Kollisionsnorm und Sachrecht. Zu Struktur, Standort und Methode des inter-
nationalen Privatrechts, Duncker and Humblot, 170–6.
66 See Knop et al. ‘From Multiculturalism to Technique’, above fn. 5, at 648–9.
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What follows for the way in which we engage in private international law? If we 
feel that private international law is of ethical importance – and how could we not? – 
then the findings here should be reason for hope. The hope is that the relation to the 
Other, that hugely important ethical issue of our times, can find an adequate ethical 
response, although in an unexpected place. Private international law, understood as 
an ethic, is not a mere technical device that leads to arbitrary responses. Nor is it a 
field that needs to be completely reinvented in order to be ethically relevant. What is 
necessary is to understand that, and how, private international law itself operates as 
an ethic, and that it does so through its technique.
That in itself is not a small step. It does not require a radical reinvention of the 
field, but it requires a fairly radical reorientation of our thinking of the field. To know 
that we are, when we apply doctrines of private international law, operating in ethical 
theory and practice, is empowering, but it also creates a great responsibility. Private 
international law, far from being at the margin of the big issues of our world, stands 
in its centre. The biggest ethical issues of our world require us to define our relation 
to the Other. Let us see how private international law as an ethic of responsivity can 
do this.

